Looking forward to the situation ｜ Russia-Ukraine conflict： individual missiles turn the tide？ (below)

Russian military battle damage assessment

There is no reliable figure for the actual loss of Russian air power since the war, but we can make a general assessment by collecting relevant photos and videos published on the Internet and analyzing them one by one. Note that the following statistics do not include drones and aircraft destroyed on the ground:

By April 4th, the Russian army had lost 4-8 Su-25s, 1-3 Su -30SM, 3 Su-34s, 1 An-26s and 1 Su-35s, totaling 10-16 fixed-wing military aircraft. In terms of helicopters, the Russian army lost three to six Mi-8s, four to seven Mi-24/35s, one Mi-28s and four Ka-52s, totaling 12 to 18 helicopters. The total loss of the two types is between 22 and 34. Among them, it can be considered that most of the helicopters were shot down by shoulder-launched air defense missiles, and it is estimated that there are about 12 helicopters.

It is difficult to judge the cause of the loss of fixed-wing aircraft. The main flying altitude and speed of these aircraft (except Su -25 and An -26) are beyond the attack range of individual air defense missiles, and it was difficult to be hunted by "low-end goods" such as Stinger. However, in the first two weeks of operations, the Russian army often used high-value supersonic fighters to throw unguided ammunition directly at ultra-low altitude, so there were also cases of being shot down by individual weapons. However, after the third week of the war, with the extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), air-launched missiles and precision-guided bombs, such risky combat methods have become rare, and the losses of supersonic fighters have also decreased sharply.

Russian Su -25 attack aircraft hit by Ukrainian portable air defense missiles.

Su -25 is a special case. Because of its slow flight speed and mainly carrying out low-altitude fire support tasks, it can be speculated that its war damage is likely to come from individual air defense bombs. In addition, the loss of an An -26 was confirmed to be due to mechanical failure. The Ukrainian army also shot down a Su -35 with high-profile publicity, and released photos. However, judging from the completeness of the wreckage of the aircraft, the possibility of a mechanical failure crash cannot be ruled out. It is still difficult to judge whether the video of a crash with a tail caught fire in the air is true or false, but the wreckage of the tail has a vague small hole, so the possibility of being shot down by a low-altitude infrared guided anti-aircraft bomb using fragments to kill the warhead cannot be ruled out. On the whole, there should be about six Russian fixed-wing fighters shot down by individual air defense missiles. The total record of the two types of individual air defense missiles is about 18.

It needs to be emphasized again that the above statistics are not rigorous, but they should be enough to outline a general outline for further analysis. The Ukrainian Air Force did not achieve any success in the air combat, which even the Kiev Base Camp Battle Report can’t deny. Because the medium-and long-range air defense systems such as Beech and S-300 were almost completely suppressed by the Russian army and most of them were destroyed, in fact, most of the air defense achievements of the Ukrainian army came from short-range low-altitude air defense firepower, accounting for 55% to 86% of the total record, which shows that Ukraine’s national air defense system has actually been destroyed.

In the low-altitude achievements of the Ukrainian army, we ruled out the possible achievements of anti-aircraft guns, vehicle-mounted field air defense systems and other means. First, there is no conclusive evidence to prove that they have achieved results. Second, it is helpful to draw further practical and credible conclusions by attributing all such achievements to individual air defense missiles.

As pointed out earlier, as many as 2,700 "stingers" have arrived in Ukraine, and Ukraine is likely to be the country with the most active "stingers" in the world except the United States. At the same time, the Ukrainian army also has a large number of "Needle" series of individual air defense missiles left by the former Soviet army, and it is conservatively estimated that there are thousands; In addition, Germany also announced that it has assisted 2,700 "needles" left over from East Germany; Britain also helped 100 "Starlight" … The Ukrainian army has about 10,000 individual air defense missiles, but their achievements are only 18, of which "Stinger" can be divided into several?

By the way, there is an extra victory that can be confirmed to be the work of Stinger. On March 31st, the Ukrainian army sent two batches of four Mi -8 upor, which "dared to die" and broke into the encirclement, trying to take away some "key figures". Three of them were shot down, and one was shot down by the captured Stinger by Donetsk militia.

Britain provided Ukraine with the Starlight portable air defense missile, which shot down a Russian Mi -28 helicopter gunship.

Low-altitude spear and shield

In theory, having 10,000 individual air defense bombs does not mean that they can all be used effectively. Russian troops have carried out many rounds of fierce air strikes on bases where Ukrainian troops have a large number of foreign aid armaments, such as Lviv, zhitomir and Vinnitsa, west of Dnieper River. A considerable number of individual air defense bombs from abroad went up in smoke in the warehouse. Other foreign aid missiles that have not been destroyed may not be able to find suitable launch opportunities. In fact, attacking enemy fighters with individual air defense missiles is always a very risky and difficult task. Even for armed helicopters and attack aircraft that often fly at ultra-low altitude.　　　

The monitoring field of view, range and attack distance of airborne sensors and fire systems are much more powerful than the simple equipment of individual air defense systems. The latest armed helicopters, such as Ka -52K and Mi -28N, have further improved their battlefield monitoring capabilities after being equipped with millimeter-wave radars. At the same time, since 2017, a DIRCM system named L370 Vitebsk has been increasingly installed on Russian helicopters and attack planes. The system can detect incoming missiles within a radius of hundreds of kilometers, and automatically launch blinding lasers and jamming bombs in the direction of missile attack. It adopts modular structure, and various components can be optionally installed on existing helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft as required.

At present, the main modules of Vitebsk system include: L370-1 control unit, L150 pastel digital radar warning receiver, L370-2 ultraviolet warning sensor, L140 "response" laser warning sensor, L370-3S digital active jammer, L370-5 infrared jammer, UV-26 jamming bomb transmitter and active towing bait. In the omni-directional live-fire test of the Mi -8 real aircraft on the elevated platform, the Vitebsk system successfully interfered with 20 incoming Needle missiles when the engine was running. The Vitebsk computer can even provide the Su-25M3 with the fire control level data of Kh-58USh anti-radiation missile, and the Su -57 stealth fighter will be equipped with this system in the future.

Russian Ka -52 helicopter gunship forced to land after being hit by a portable air defense missile.

In the face of such opponents, it is actually very difficult for the "stingers" to achieve success. In addition to relying on buildings, mountains, jungles and other shelters to carry out sudden and covert attacks, the tactics of setting up a favorable position in advance and using a large number of individual air defense bombs to gather fire to attack targets are also often adopted by the Ukrainian army on the battlefield. The legendary "alligator" that dodged 18 bombs was obviously attacked like this. However, it is not easy to organize such an ambush effectively, and even if it is organized, it is still likely that the incoming fighters will find it first and destroy it first.

However, the Ukrainian army also has advantages outside the battlefield. Although the Ukrainian army’s own air defense command and control system has been completely paralyzed, NATO has a strong overseas battlefield monitoring capability. Since the start of the war, NATO has three E-3 early warning aircraft flying 24 hours a day along the northwestern and western borders of Ukraine until the southern coastline. At the same time, there are also the Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, RC-135 electronic reconnaissance aircraft, ground monitoring stations, radars and reconnaissance satellites to collect all kinds of Russian intelligence in real time. It is reported that the tactical intelligence collected by NATO can be shared with the Ukrainian military headquarters within two hours. If a single-soldier missile wants to fire at the enemy before it is discovered by an incoming fighter, it is very important whether it can aim the sighting system and seeker at the incoming direction of the enemy plane in advance. The Ukrainian army obviously does not have such ability. However, with the support of NATO intelligence, Ukrainian individual air defense missiles may exert more power than their performance itself.

Even so, the results achieved by the "stingers" are still too few. For the Russian army with the world’s top three air forces, its air-ground firepower cannot be weakened by the loss of "fur" of 20 or 30 aircraft. In fact, from the third week of the war, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that the Russian army had entered the second phase of operations, and the coverage and strike intensity of Russian air forces have been escalating.

Stinger air defense missile.

Solve the "myth"

Finally, let’s go back to that long-standing legend. Stinger began to serve in the US military in 1981. Later, the improved FIM-92C model was taken as an example. Its maximum range was about 4,800 meters, the minimum range was 2,000 meters, the effective shooting height was 3,800 meters, and the maximum flight speed was Mach 2.2. Passive infrared/ultraviolet homing is adopted, which has the ability to ignore after launch and certain anti-jamming ability. The total weight of the cartridge of a single system is 13.3 kg. On the whole, the performance of this type of missile is not particularly outstanding compared with other similar contemporary products in the world.

The Stinger missile first entered the war in the 1982 British-Ama War. At the end of 1986, the missile was first launched on the battlefield in Afghanistan, shooting down a Soviet Mi -24. Before the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the United States provided about 900 to 1,200 "stingers" to Afghan guerrillas. In 1993, the American Yearbook of Air Defense Artillery claimed that Stinger had fired 340 pieces in Afghanistan and shot down 269 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, and the hunting probability was close to 80%-the myth was born.

However, the outside world has always been generally reserved about this figure. According to Soviet data, from 1987 to 1988, they lost 35 fixed-wing aircraft and 63 helicopters, of which 52 were lost in 1987, and only 14 individual air defense missiles caused losses. Another third-party source pointed out that the total record of Stinger in the whole Afghan war (1986-1989) was 74, which was only 27.5% of the results announced by the US.

Su -25 attack aircraft, which are often active at low altitude, are often attacked by portable air defense missiles, but the Su -25 with rough skin can often return safely with injuries.

The influence of "Stinger" on the overall war situation in Afghanistan is even more insignificant. First of all, it entered the war too late. The war in Afghanistan in 1986 has already entered a "garbage time" for Moscow, and the Politburo has been waiting for a less humiliating opportunity or excuse to withdraw. Stinger did play a certain tactical role in the first few months of the war. However, the Soviet army soon found restraint methods, including installing infrared warning systems, dropping infrared jamming bombs, and high-altitude penetration. These measures significantly reduced the hunting efficiency of Stinger. At the same time, in view of the guerrilla tactics of setting an ambush at the edge of the Soviet airport to attack the low-speed transport aircraft in the take-off and landing state, Soviet pilots are increasingly using the "violent" operation mode of rapid descent after entering the field at high altitude to avoid the "sting", and the effect is also good.

The guerrillas finally concluded that "Stinger" may force Soviet helicopters and attack planes to attack from a higher altitude, thus reducing the attack accuracy of Soviet fighters, but that’s all. It didn’t achieve more results than simple anti-aircraft weapons such as machine guns, anti-aircraft guns or RPG. Even after the Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, Kabul government forces could still rely on their limited air power to defeat guerrilla offensives many times. It can be seen that it is still difficult to limit the enemy air force in the face of the "stinger" of weaker opponents.