The ＂chip bill＂ of the world’s technological hegemony is unpopular.
Recently, US President Biden officially signed the "Chip Act". Experts believe that the bill threatens the security of the global chip supply chain and distorts the chip trade. It is a hegemonic act of economic coercion by the United States and is unpopular.
Xinhua News Agency reporter Shi Yimeng:
Hello, netizens of Xinhuanet, and welcome to On the World. Recently, US President Biden signed the "Chip Act". What kind of bill is this? What truths are hidden behind the bill? Today, we are very honored to invite Li Yong, deputy director of the Expert Committee of China International Trade Association, to deeply understand the mystery behind this bill with us. Welcome, Director Li!
Li Yong, Deputy Director of the Expert Committee of China International Trade Association:
Hello, everyone. I’m very glad to have this opportunity to discuss with you the impact of the chip bill in the United States.
Shi Xiaomeng:
The "Chip Act" we just mentioned will provide more than $52 billion in government subsidies for semiconductor research and production in the United States, and will also provide investment tax credits and other policies for chip factories. What do you think is the purpose behind the US government’s tax cuts and subsidies? What are your political intentions?
Li Yong:
The background of the "Chip Act" in the United States is actually what we call a great change in a hundred years, but its understanding of this great change is different from ours. It is to maintain its hegemony.
The United States has technological hegemony in the field of semiconductors. From the overall layout, it is that the United States regards chips as the core strategic resource and should firmly grasp the future direction of global science and technology development. In fact, it is necessary to give priority to the United States and its interests, suppress the so-called competitors, delay the development of China, and curb the development momentum of China’s high technology.
One purpose of the United States is to move these industries to the United States. These companies don’t go, TSMC doesn’t go, Samsung doesn’t go, can’t Intel do it? Can’t Micron do it? Actually, I can do it. But there is no way to compete with Samsung, SK Hynix and TSMC, because there are technical know-how. What if the United States doesn’t have these know-how? Sorry, (you) came to the United States to build a factory.
So there is a very elaborate layout. This layout is not only aimed at China, but also at its so-called allies, giving priority to the interests of the United States. In fact, it means that "my hegemonic position must be guaranteed."
Shi Xiaomeng:
In the Chip Act of the United States, companies that have received investment tax credits are not allowed to expand or build new semiconductor production facilities in countries that pose a national security threat to the United States, such as China. How do you evaluate this economic coercion?
Li Yong:
This is actually the so-called technological hegemony, technological bullying, technological coercion, technological extortion, technological exploitation and so on contained in American hegemony. What it wants is not that everyone in the world can develop together. What does it want? I develop. You take my money, you have to do my thing.
Now we are actually targeting Asian companies that have advantages for the United States, such as Samsung, SK Hynix, TSMC, and some other companies. These enterprises all have factories in China (mainland China). If these factories can enjoy some technologies that are updated at any time, the purpose of the United States to suppress China will not be realized. So some people say that this article is also called "poison pill clause".
Such a "chip bill", reflected by the international media and the industry, not many people believe that it will succeed. One is unpopular, and its practice is unpopular, but these people say that it will not succeed not from the emotional point of view, but from a calm, scientific and economic judgment point of view, it is selfish. Its final outcome is anti-economic law and anti-market law!
Shi Xiaomeng:
You just mentioned that the United States is actually rearranging the layout of the world with the priority of the United States. What impact and impact do you think this "chip hegemony" behavior of the United States will have on the global chip supply chain?
Li Yong:
After the "Chip Act" came out, the balance of global supply chain was broken and no longer stable. In these years, the optimized supply chain relationship formed by the chip industry will no longer exist, and it will no longer have the previous efficiency; The cost structure of supply chain is distorted, and the future supply chain no longer has comparative advantages, and it is no longer a specialized and refined cooperative division of labor. The industry believes that producing chips in the United States will increase the cost by 50%.
If it can be implemented, the United States will make all (chips) and form a whole industrial chain in the United States. At this time, the so-called supply chain monopoly problem will appear, and monopoly operation is inevitable.
In this process, because of the "poison pill clause", there is discrimination (rules) in the supply chain, which will distort the chip trade, that is, the chip trade is no longer free.
Shi Xiaomeng:
How does the American Chip Act affect China’s chip industry? In the face of the U.S. siege of China, what are our strategies to break the situation?
Li Yong:
Stop supply or target some enterprises, and specific enterprises are blacklisted. The future planning of these enterprises may be affected. Around the trade flow and investment flow of the chip industry, the investment flow may be cooled. In this process, we will also be threatened by the jurisdiction of the long arm.
Every time we confront the United States, we have learned valuable experience. We just do our own thing. You hit yours and I hit mine. We have a lot of confidence, and there may be some shocks at the beginning, but we will soon create a buffer period.
Of course, we have other things, such as our institutional advantages, the national system, overall strategic planning, concentration of superior resources, and the use of our national system to do great things; At the same time, experts in these industries will also seek something new, such as (technical) differentiation. I think we have enough coping styles in our toolbox.
Planning: Liu Jiawen
Executive Planning: Yang Dingdu, Liu Chang, Xu Qian.
Coordinator: Bi Qiulan and Liu Xiaojun
Special guest:
Li Yong, Deputy Director of the Expert Committee of China International Trade Association
Special host: Shi Xiaomeng
Editor: Hou Qiang Wu Yinan Shi Huafei (Internship)
Edit: Tian jiankai
Shooting: Xu Nan Zhao Yixin
Visual design: Yang Jixin
Xinhuanet and International Department jointly produced.
Produced by Xinhua News Agency’s International Communication Integration Platform